The Shores of Tripoli

Remember the Powell Doctrine? This was the set of principles to guide the use of military force, developed by General Colin Powell out of his experience in Viet Nam. There were basically three tenets to the doctrine; actually more like three tests to be met before using military force.
1. Can the mission be accomplished with military force? Don’t look for political solutions to be imposed by soldiers.
2. Are we going in with overwhelming force? Once the shooting starts, you better have enough guns to finish the job.
3. Is there a defined exit strategy? Once you have committed to the use of force, how are you going to extricate your troops? Democracies make poor occupying powers.

The first Gulf War was a classic application of this doctrine. We kicked the Iraqis out of Kuwait, and then we went home. The countervailing examples are Iraq and Afghanistan, of course. Nine years later we are still trying to build stable democratic societies so we can get out.

To show that we never seem to learn from our mistakes, consider the military involvement in Libya. Part of the mission seems clear enough, and militarily feasible: our war aim is to end the regime of Moammar Gadhafi. But who do we want to end up in charge over there? Our policy is a little vague on that score, since we don’t seem to be able to identify exactly who the rebels are.

As an aside, in a classic bit of Orwellian Newspeak, our military intervention has been labeled “a humanitarian mission.” Sure, because nothing says you are overflowing with the milk of human kindness like firing off 160 cruise missiles.

Although the NATO forces have complete air supremacy, the Gadhafi regime has not obliged us by folding up their tents and moving into exile. We control the skies, but the regime is reextending its hold on the ground. So we’re in a shooting war, but we haven’t committed the forces required to win.

Finally, what is our exit strategy? Since we don’t have any ground forces committed, we could just end the mission and send the planes and ships home. But after shooting at Gadhafi, what do we do then? If we leave him still in charge, doesn’t that make the humanitarian problem worse? After all, now that the rebels have announced themselves, I don’t think he’ll be satisfied with a live and let live policy.

The time to think about these issues is before you commit military force. Instead, our policy was based on optimistically assuming that the regime would quietly surrender, or go into exile, or some undefined happy outcome. Happy for us, that is. Not so great for Gadhafi or his family.

From where I’m sitting, the situation in Libya looks like a fiasco unfolding in slow motion.